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Army Aviation is considering pursuing the development of a future vertical lift (FVL) 
aircraft to replace its aging medium variant helicopters, which are the UH-60 Blackhawk 
and AH-64 Apache.  The medium variant platforms comprise about 75 percent of the 
current Army fleet.  Although its current fleet is over 30 years in age, to date, the Army is 
unsure if the fleet should be replaced based upon cost, material condition, and 
technological capability.  The critical issue is that the Army lacks objective research data 
to support the decision to either pursue a new aircraft or retain the current fleet.  The 
intent of our research is to determine exactly how much any individual medium variant 
platform costs, per flight hour, and project its cost behavior over time.  That information 
will then be compared to a cost benefit analysis of a new build platform to help Army 
Aviation leadership with its FVL ambitions. 
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As the federal budget tightens and the Department of Defense (DoD) evaluates all future 
programs for fiscal conservatism, the time is ever present for program executive offices 
throughout the Army, and her sister services, to properly plan, evaluate, and execute 
budgetary accountability.  Army Aviation has set a tentative mark on the wall for the 
future of its rotary-wing aviation with the Future Vertical Lift (FVL) program.  Looking 
to justify the program, the Program Executive Office for Army Aviation (PEO Aviation) 
must be able to explain the need for a new aircraft through various concessions. Our task 
was to analyze one of these concessions: Can individual airframe cost over time 
determine its age and, furthermore, be used to draw a fiscal line at which point a 
replacement airframe would be needed? 
With the assistance of PEO Aviation, we analyzed the data from 60 randomly 
selected aircraft: 30 UH-60 Blackhawks and 30 AH-64 Apaches.  Data used includes 
maintenance records, man-hour costs, equipment costs, and man-hours required.  What 
we discovered through our analysis and research is that the maintenance records did not 
provide sufficient data to accurately cost measure the aircraft’s age in regard to 
maintenance costs.  The records did not provide a historically accurate portrait; 
maintenance records did not indicate the corrective action taken, the amount of man-
hours actually performed, or the parts required to mitigate the fault.  Without this data 
and/or multiple assumptions, we were unable to develop a trend line indicating growth, 
decline, or stability in airframe cost over time. 
Desiring to create a quality product for PEO Aviation to utilize in its analysis of 
the need for FVL, we contacted two of our sister services who maintain and operate 
variants of the UH-60 aircraft.  The United States Coast Guard (USCG) utilizes an 
integrative system, the Aviation Logistics Management Information System (ALMIS), to 
integrate its maintenance, supply, and budget systems.  As a small service, the USCG is 
accustomed to heavy budget scrutiny; therefore, it developed this system in order to 
justify all actions needed for its aviation fleet.  The USCG obliged our research needs and 
provided us with the detailed information from its ALMIS database.  Although told that 
 xvi 
ALMIS had the cost function built into the system, the ALMIS managers were unable to 
break out the individual cost for parts during our research.  Regardless of our inability to 
procure the necessary data to complete the comparative analysis, the ALMIS system 
proves to be a step in the right direction for maintainers/leaders to assess readiness. 
Our research does conclude that ALMIS is a quality system that should be 
examined to develop an Army enterprise maintenance program.  A program like this will 
be costly to design and implement, but once maintainers are trained, the system will 
provide quantitative feedback to users at all levels.  Leadership will have higher visibility 
on the status of equipment, financial managers can better plan for future events, and 
PEOs can more effectively manage upgrades/replacements to keep the warfighter in the 
fight with the best weapons. Introducing a variant of ALMIS, improving upon the USCG 
database structure, and using lessons learned will inevitably increase awareness and 
efficiency throughout Army Aviation.    
In conclusion, we were unable to answer the specific question we originally 
proposed.  However, throughout the process, we did discover glaring issues, through our 
scope of investigation, that need to be addressed in order that future evaluations may be 
conducted and prove fruitful.  We do propose that if detailed aircraft costing data is 
available through alternate sources, then further research should be conducted and 
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A. ARMY AVIATION COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE AH-64 APACHE 
AND UH-60 BLACKHAWK 
The United States Army has a rich aviation tradition.  Manned flight by Army 
aviators spans nearly 100 years and covers every major conflict since the Civil War 
(Bradin, 1994, p. 49). Army Aviation was the birthplace for many revolutionary advances 
in flight, including the first use of fixed-wing aircraft in combat, numerous experimental 
projects, and the integration of rotary-wing aircraft into the span of combat operations.   
Time and again, the United States Army has revolutionized combat operations 
through its employment of aviation assets. Regardless of the leaps in technology, the 
keystone to Army aviation’s success is how it blends technology with highly trained 
personnel while conducting its mission.  As imagined, the rigors of war leverage a heavy 
toll on man and equipment.  Furthermore, advances in global technology also require the 
Army to upgrade its aircraft to meet emerging threats and capabilities.   
Army aviation has reacted well to the aforementioned requirements throughout 
history—especially when considering its rotary-wing fleet.  Supporting a modernization 
strategy for Army aviation is the focus of this research.  In this chapter, we briefly discuss 
the modernization of the Army aviation fleet since World War 2 (WW2).  Furthermore, 
the chapter provides insight on how the current fleet of AH-64 Apaches, UH-60 
Blackhawks, OH-58 Kiowas, and CH-47 Chinooks have evolved to their current force 
structure and configurations.  In this chapter, we then define the main goal of the 
research, which is to conduct a detailed cost benefit analysis (CBA) of the UH-60 and 
AH-64 to determine the cost behaviors associated with maintaining the fleet.  That CBA 
is then used to determine if and when it is advisable to modernize the medium variant 
fleet of aircraft (UH-60 and AH-64).  
B. ARMY AVIATION ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT IN COMBAT 
One of the key attributes of the U.S. Army’s aviation program is its use of 
helicopters since WW2.  Following that war, the Army Air Corps divested the majority of 
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its fixed-wing assets to build the modern U.S. Air Force in accordance with the 1947 
National Defense Authorization Act (Bradin, 1994, p. 61).  Shortly thereafter, in 1952, 
the Army shifted its focus to retaining a robust rotary-wing fleet (Bradin, 1994, p. 78).  
The first combat rotary-wing mission conducted by the Army was during WW2 (Bradin, 
1994, p. 59).  During the Korean War, the Army integrated more helicopters into its 
combat operations.  It was not until the Vietnam conflict when the Army truly 
revolutionized rotary-wing combat aviation tactics.  
The Army’s employment of the UH-1 Iroquois, AH-1 Cobra, and CH-47 Chinook 
revolutionized modern combat operations forever.  The speed, maneuverability, and 
flexibility of the helicopter became the critical enabler for the Army during the conflict. 
Army aviators and maintainers developed new tactics for flying and sustaining the 
aircraft, many of which are still used today.  The new technology of the time, resident in 
the CH-47, AH-1, and UH-1, proved instrumental in the success of the Army during the 
Vietnam conflict.  The successes of the Army aviation enterprise in Vietnam securely 
locked its future as a must-have asset on the battlefield for all conflicts to follow. Pictures 
of the CH-47, AH-1, and UH-1 are provided in Figures 1–3. 
  
Figure 1.  CH-47 Chinook in Vietnam (from Leonard, 2006)  
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Figure 2.  UH-1 “Huey” in Vietnam (from The Museum of Flight, n.d.) 
 
Figure 3.  AH-1 Cobra in Vietnam (from Vietnam War, 2008) 
The post-Vietnam era for Army aviation resulted in significant leaps in rotary 
wing technology.  The lessons learned from the Vietnam conflict garnered significant 
political support and funding for various projects focused on modernizing the Army 
aviation fleet with platforms that could dominate Soviet technologies.  The resulting fleet 
included the UH-60, AH-64, OH-58D, and CH-47D.   
C. POST-VIETNAM AND ARMY AVIATION 
The Vietnam conflict demonstrated the utility and necessity of helicopters on the 
modern battlefield.  As such, and despite a post-war reduction in funding, the Army 
received appropriations to continue its development of rotary-wing assets (Bradin, 1994, 
p. 78).  Lessons learned in Vietnam led to the development of the UH-1, OH-58, AH-1, 
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and CH-47.  The Vietnam Conflict can be considered the birthplace of Army aviation 
tactics.  The four aforementioned aircraft were the early manifestations of the current 
attack, utility, and cargo fleet. 
The mid-1970s through early 1980s were the key developmental years for the 
modern Army aviation fleet (minus the CH-47).  Cold War tensions and concerns over 
the growth of the Soviet war machine presented a clear and present need for advanced 
multiengine utility, observation, attack, and heavy-lift aircraft.  The Army was focused on 
posturing for the emerging Soviet threat.  The resultant fleet of modernized aircraft 
included the AH-64A, OH-58D, CH-47D, and UH-60 A/L.  These aircraft included 
significant leaps in both performance and technological capability. 
D. OPERATION DESERT STORM 
The United States experienced its first major conflict against a Soviet-style 
standing army in Kuwait and Iraq in the early 1990s during Operation Desert Storm.  
This was the first true test of the modernized Army aviation fleet of AH-64s, UH-60s, 
CH-47s, and OH-58Ds.  The aviation fleet was a critical enabler for all ground maneuver 
operations during the short conflict.  As a matter of fact, the AH-64 fired the first ground 
shot of the war (Bradin, 1994, p. 182). 
E. POST–DESERT STORM AND PRE-9/11 
The tactical successes of the fleet during Operation Desert Storm secured 
aviation’s position as a critical battlefield enabler.  The years following the war remained 
focused on Cold War threats.  Units conducted combined arms training exercises that 
deeply relied on Army aviation support.  Additionally, the military experienced a 
significant reduction in force following Operation Desert Storm.  It was around this time 
period that the Army divested its remaining legacy fleet of AH and UH-1 aircraft.  The 
Army continued to upgrade/modernize the fleet of 60s, 64s, 58Ds, and 47s during the 
legacy divestiture.  The upgrades included the transformation of the AH-64A to the AH-
64D Longbow and the UH-60A/L and CH-47A/B/C/D to the CH-47F.   
 5 
F. THE MODERN FLEET AND THE EFFECTS OF POST-9/11 
OPERATIONS—AND THE WAY AHEAD 
As the Department of Defense (DoD) enters the second decade of a protracted 
war effort, the toll on equipment and manning has proven arduous.  Although the Global 
War on Terrorism has led to various leaps in military technological ability, the 
predominant portion of the equipment has been in the inventory in excess of 30 years.  
This is very much the case for the Army aviation fleet.  The primary deployable fleet of 
aircraft includes the AH-64D Longbow, CH-47D/F Chinook, OH-58D Kiowa Warrior, 
and UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters.  These airframes comprise the majority of the 
“fighting” fleet, but the Army also has myriad fixed-wing, unmanned aerial systems 
(UAS), and continental United States (CONUS)— only aircraft.  Of the entire fleet, the 
only primary “new-build” aircraft are the unmanned aerial systems and CONUS LUH-72 
Lakota.  
Nearly all of the rotary-wing aircraft in the Army inventory are over a decade old. 
We theorize that the effects of the prolonged war have expedited the aging process of the 
respective airframes.  For example, an AH-64D may have been built 12 years ago, but the 
aircraft “thinks” it is nearly 40 years of age, due to the stressors of the high operational 
tempo. Pre-September 11, 2001, Army Aircraft flew approximately 140 hours per year. 
Since September 11, 2001, the aircraft have flown in excess of 90 hours a month (1080 
hours a year) in combat under stresses not expected in a garrison environment (PEO 
Aviation, email, 28 October 2013).  Stressors include, but are not limited to, high-power 
settings due to extreme heat, occurrences of battle damage, and hard landings due to 
enemy-forced emergency procedures.  Figure 4 highlights the number of combat flight 
hours accrued since the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism. 
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Figure 4.  Army Aviation Operational Tempo for Operation Enduring Freedom and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (from Program Office for Army Aviation [PEO 
Aviation], 2013)  
In addition, many of the current Army Aviation fleet was designed over 30 years 
ago.  Technological and production obsolescence plague the fleet as many of the prime 
manufacturers have discontinued the product lines of subcomponents designed for the 
current fleet.  Each of these issues, coupled with the high demand for Army Aviation, has 
forced the acquisition community to essentially “Band-Aid” the fleet in order to keep 
aircraft supplied to the fight, and at a cost.  Keeping the aircraft deployable requires 
continual deep-cycle scheduled maintenance as aircraft return from combat operations.  
Additionally, the aircraft are continually upgraded to rectify technological obsolescence. 
Figure 5 lays out the current life estimates of all of the Army Aviation aircraft. The figure 
captures Army Aviation’s modernization plan and how the Apache, Blackhawk, and 
Chinook have evolved from their base models to their current configurations.  
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Figure 5.  Army Aviation Modernization Plan (from PEO Aviation, 2013) 
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Currently, 70 percent of the Army Aviation Enterprise budget is allocated toward 
fleet sustainment, with the remaining 30 percent aimed at obsolescence upgrades and 
limited new aircraft purchases. The Army has primarily sustained and addressed only 
critical subcomponent obsolescence issues due to the rigorous combat demand for rotary-
wing aircraft and budget constraints.  If the Army does not address the current state of the 
fleet, there may very well be a significant sustainment cost in the future to retain the 
airworthiness of the elderly fleet.  Moreover, national security could be a risk if the U.S. 
government does not look to invest in future Army Aviation capabilities.  
Based upon initial maintenance assessments and the realities of the Army 
Aviation enterprise budget, we believe that these are the possible courses of action to 
address this issue:  
• maintain the current fleet and address critical flight-safety obsolescence 
issues, 
• invest in a new start future development platform, and 
• maintain the current fleet—aka the “do nothing” approach. 
The costs and benefits for these three recommended courses of action are described as 
follows. 
G. MAINTAIN THE CURRENT FLEET AND ADDRESS CRITICAL 
FLIGHT-SAFETY OBSOLESCENCE ISSUES 
This course of action is in keeping with the current approved fiscal year (FY) 
2012–2017 president's budget for the Army Aviation Enterprise.  This is the status quo 
course of action.  The current budgeted amount for this course of action is $56.6 billion.  
The benefit of executing this course of action is that the funding is already approved, it 
meets the demands of the current war, it will not require an investment in the training or 
logistical system, and it is assumed to be more affordable than executing a new start 
program.   
The risk of executing this plan is that it does not address the increasing 
obsolescence issues of the current fleet.  As the technology on the aircraft ages, the prime 
contractors that originally developed the subcomponents are discontinuing the respective 
production lines due to non-profitability and the antiquation of production equipment.  In 
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addition, the reset and post-deployment deep-cycle maintenance do not rectify the sub-
core airframe age.  The maintenance actions simply clean and spot-repair the airframe 
substructure and replace subcomponent parts.  As a result of these maintenance actions, 
the aircraft is essentially the same age it was when it entered maintenance. 
H. INVEST IN A FUTURE VERTICAL LIFT PLATFORM 
This course of action is not funded in the FY2012–2017 president’s budget.  The 
course of action will require significant research, design, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) 
and Aviation Procurement Army (APA) investments to accomplish.  Furthermore, if this 
program were executed in FY2013, the first unit equipped would not be expected until 
2025.  Choosing this course of action will rectify the majority of the current fleet’s 
obsolescence issues and guarantee technological superiority for the nation.  By 
developing a medium variant form factor to replace the UH and AH fleet, the Army will 
replace 75 percent of its current fleet.  This course of action will also keep the American 
defense industry primed and “hot.”  The counterargument to this course of action is that it 
may be unaffordable within the current fiscal environment.   
The total RDT&E investment for a new build is unknown at this time.  The 
optimistic unit cost per airframe will be $30–$40 million.  Furthermore, introducing a 
new platform will require a significant operations and maintenance (O&M) investment 
in both the training and logistical systems.  Finally, selecting this course of action will 
require decommissioning the current fleet, which requires a redirecting of sustainment 
funding to the new build project.  Deciding the optimal time for the funding shift could 
prove very risky and volatile, and could significantly impact national security. 
I. MAINTAIN THE CURRENT FLEET—AKA STATUS QUO OR DO 
NOTHING 
The Army does have the option to do nothing.  This means that the Army will not 
continue obsolescence upgrades and only just maintain the current fleet of aircraft.  Of 
course, this option might create a significant risk to the Army’s posture. Significant risk 
could be contributable to a lack of objective understanding of the physical condition and 
useful life remaining on the current fleet.  This option is the cheapest of the three 
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possibilities, but the Army would be forced to accept risk in both flight-safety factors and 
technological obsolescence.  The lack of a future modernization strategy could jeopardize 
the Army’s dominant position for future conflicts. 
J. BUDGET REALITIES AND THE NEED FOR OBJECTIVE 
POSITIONING 
The 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) was set in motion in the spring of 2013.  
This BCA, better known as sequestration, presents an entirely new challenge to the DoD 
and Army Aviation (Congressional Budget Office [CBO], 2012). Sequestration sets 
mandatory spending reductions across the discretionary accounts throughout the 
executive branch of the U.S. government. These budget reductions could reduce the 
budget to as low as 40 percent of the current program baselines within Army aviation.  
This means that requests for investment funding (i.e., RDT&E) will be heavily 
scrutinized.  Future discretionary budget reductions will lead to the urgent requirement 
for Army Aviation to be precisely certain of its position, regardless of which course of 
action is selected.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) chart in Figure 6 shows the 




Figure 6.  CBO Predicted Funding Trends (from CBO, 2012) 
The PEO Aviation initiated a joint-level study effort to identify both the 
requirements associated with a FVL platform and the true condition of the current fleet.  
PEO Aviation also contributed to the development of a council of colonels to spearhead 
this effort.  In 2012, the Aviation branch chief set 2020 as a target year for a possible 
fielding of a future vertical lift aircraft–medium (FVL–M).  The aviation enterprise 
initially targeted the medium variant airframes due to their proliferation in the Army, 
Navy, and Coast Guard fleets.  More specifically, the joint collaboration wants to analyze 
the UH-60 and AH-64 platforms. 
PEO Aviation initiated various studies in order to develop an objective 
understanding of the status and potential of the current fleet. The research in this project 
is included in that plan.  Harvesting accurate fleet data is critical to objectively identify 
the physical ability of the aircraft to last until 2020 or beyond.  The PEO Aviation study 
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groups are leveraging numerous existing maintenance tracking systems that include the 
User-Level Logistics System—Aviation (ULLS-A), Electronic Logbook Automation 
System (ELAS), and the Standard Army Information System (STAMIS).   
A large amount of data is available for the different studies, but no single source 
can provide precise costing data associated with any individual aircraft.  Significant 
political support during the Global War on Terrorism for Army Aviation operations 
resulted in robust funding levels that allowed for funding aggregate upgrades and 
maintenance.  The large funding levels were good in the sense that they allowed for the 
flexibility and reaction time needed to keep aircraft in the fight.  Conversely, this funding 
did not force the Army to track “by the eaches” when it comes to how much an individual 
aircraft is costing the Army.  The assumption is that “maintenance costs reflect age”; that 
is, the more an aircraft costs to maintain per flight hour the more it is aging. 
In order for the Army to pursue a FVL platform, it must know for sure that the 
current fleet of medium variant aircraft cannot last beyond 2020. This research is needed 
for helping the Army make an educated decision on what to do about Army Aviation.  In 
short, this research is intended to supplement the overall study being conducted by PEO 
Aviation.  The intent for this project is to approach the objective knowledge gap from a 
different perspective than the other research centers. 
K. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
In this research, we hypothesize an airframe’s repair cost per flight hour is an 
indicator of age.  The theory is that as an aircraft ages, its cost per flight hour to maintain 
will increase.  We plot that cost behavior on a time line to determine the most cost-
beneficial time for the Army to divest the legacy airframe and pursue a FVL-M platform.  
The research focuses on both the UH-60 and AH-64D airframes in order to stay in 
line with the current Army Aviation enterprise intent. We attempt to identify the 
maintenance flight hour cost per individual airframe.  We used a random sample of data 




determining a standardized population behavior of the fleet through the central limit 
theorem. For pictures of the AH-64D Apache Longbow and UH-60 A/L/M Blackhawk, 
see Figures 7 and 8. 
  
Figure 7.  AH-64D Apache Longbow (from Boeing, n.d.) 
 
Figure 8.  UH-60 Blackhawk (from Sikorsky, n.d.) 
Our intent is to dig beyond the Army’s current aggregate costing and determine if 
the individual aircraft O&M costs, annual or cumulative, can be used to determine the 




identified during this research can be leveraged by Army Aviation to determine if current 
obsolescence upgrades and maintenance programs are keeping the ownership cost down 




Our goal was to look at UH-60 Blackhawk and AH-64 Apache maintenance data 
in order to estimate the cost to maintain those aircraft as a function of aircraft age.  We 
then planned to give those data to PEO Aviation in Huntsville, Alabama, so that its 
decision makers could determine whether there was a need to replace those aircraft.  In 
this chapter, we look at the data we received, the two different processes we used to 
analyze the data, and the issues we had in analyzing the data. 
B. DATA RECEPTION AND PROCESS ONE 
To start the flow of information, PEO Aviation sent us logbook data in Microsoft 
Excel format for 30 Apache and Blackhawk aircraft.  The data included all maintenance 
actions that were recorded in the ULLS-A since the aircrafts’ last upgrades.  Each aircraft 
came with two documents: scheduled and unscheduled maintenance.  The unscheduled 
data went back to the early 2000s, and the scheduled data went back to about 2006.  This 
information combined to give us a history that was as complete as the Army could 
provide. 
We started with the AH-64 logbooks and combined all of the entries from both 
documents for one aircraft.  For our first attempt, Process One, we reviewed the data 
element by element to determine a cost for each maintenance action.  To find each cost, 
we first checked the Interactive Electronic Technical Manual (IETM) to determine the 
number of Soldiers that were needed to complete the task.  We then used the Man-Hour 
Allocation Chart (MAC), which gave the number of hours that each action was expected 
to take.  With that information, we had everything we needed for the personnel cost of the 
maintenance action.  To find the parts costs, we used the Federal Logistics Data 
(FEDLOG) system.  After we determined the personnel and parts costs, we added a 
standard cost if a maintenance test flight (MTF) was required and a standard cost if 
maintenance operational check (MOC) was required.  The final equation we used was 
((men used) x (man-hours used) x (36.72))+(parts costs)+(MOC)+(MTF).   
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The goal with using this equation was to find the cost of each maintenance action 
over the life of the aircraft and then separate those actions into monthly totals.  We then 
divided each month’s totals by the number of flight hours that the aircraft flew that month 
and then plotted the data, giving a trend over time.  We hoped this trend, when averaged 
with the trends from all of the other aircraft, would show a pattern of how aircraft age 
affects cost.   
C. ISSUES WITH PROCESS ONE 
When we starting sorting the data, we had high hopes of being able to get through 
all of the UH-60s and AH-64s in the time allotted.  We quickly found that it took about 
an hour to get through about four maintenance actions.  The time involved did not deter 
us at this point because we thought we would become faster at finding the costs as we 
gained experience using the IETM.  The issue was that we could not find every single 
maintenance action that was written up in the IETM.  On top of that, even if we could 
find the action in the IETM, the maintenance logs were not always clear about whether a 
part was replaced or repaired.  The logs also did not give clear corrective actions for 
every write-up.  Another major problem that we encountered with that data is that the 
older the data got, the less reliable it was.  This problem arose because the system that is 
used to track the maintenance was phased in and not all of the aircraft had as much data 
to examine.  These issues forced us to make many assumptions and speculations. When 
the assumptions started to outnumber our facts, we decided to build another process for 
analyzing the data. 
D. PROCESS TWO 
For our second attempt to analyze the data, Process Two, we attempted to 
categorize maintenance actions into three separate tiers to mitigate the fact that we could 
not determine all of the specific costs with Process One.  To develop the tiers, we used a 
similar equation from Process One, minus MOC and MTF: ((men used) x (man-hours 
used) x (36.72))+(parts costs).  We then reviewed the logbooks and found maintenance 
actions that we could determine the costs for and added them to a list until we had 
enough actions to determine a trend in the data.  We then separated the data by the costs 
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we found.  Tier One actions involved significant costs, Tier Two consisted of actions 
with less cost, and Tier Three included the least expensive actions.  Then we averaged the 
costs for the maintenance actions to determine a tier cost.  Tables 1 and 2 show the 
breakdown for Tiers One and Two, respectively, of the AH-64 Apache. 
Table 1.   Tier One 
 
Table 2.   Tier Two 
 
Tier Three costs were used for daily inspections and minor repairs.  To determine 
the cost of this tier, we assigned two maintenance man-hours to represent a repair that is 
completed quickly and developed a cost of $73.44 per Tier Three action.  
Once the tiers were built, we reviewed the list of maintenance actions and placed 
a 1, 2, 3, or N/A next to each one, with the following meanings:  
• A “1” entered in the spreadsheet populated the Tier One cost of 
$274,133.18.  
• A “2” entered in the spreadsheet populated the Tier Two cost of 
$22,028.21.  
• A “3” entered in the spreadsheet populated the Tier Three cost of $73.44. 
• An “N/A” entered in the spreadsheet did not populate a price and was used 
for double entries and entries that required no actions. 
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Our assumption in determining the costs for the three tiers was that the cost itself 
was less important than our using the numbers consistently to determine the data trends 
over time.   
E. ISSUES WITH PROCESS TWO 
Process Two presented its own challenges.  The major issue that we had with 
analyzing the data with this method is that there were so many unknown variables in the 
data.  As in Process One, we did not know if parts had been replaced or repaired, but, 
more importantly, with many actions, we could not tell what, if anything, had been done 
to correct the maintenance write-up.  Because parts had the greatest influence on the cost 
of each maintenance action, we did not think that our data were accurate enough to draw 
any conclusions. 
F. THE NEXT STEP 
Because we were unable to analyze the data that the Army tracks, we searched for 
another service that kept the data we thought important in determining the aircraft cost 
over time.  Our search yielded one service that managed its maintenance with the level of 
detail that we required: the USCG.  Our way ahead was to analyze the USCG’s UH-60 
data to determine if, in fact, we could find a trendline in the data.  A positive trend would 
indicate that the Army must take steps to more tightly track its data so that it can show 
Congress when the fleet should be replaced. 
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III. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD AVIATION LOGISTICS 
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM 
The USCG, a component of the Department of Homeland Security, serves to 
protect the nation’s ports, waterways, coast, and international waters in support of 
national security (USCG, n.d. b). A key component in accomplishing this large task is to 
use both naval and aviation assets.  The USCG’s inventory consists of 211 aircraft, with a 
mix of rotary-wing, fixed-wing, and UAS aircraft (USCG, n.d. b).  With a tighter budget 
than its sister services—$9.79 billion, per the FY2014 president’s budget—and a similar 
posture to be fiscally responsible, the USCG strives to utilize the most cost-effective 
maintenance, logistics, and procurement procedures (USCG, 2013).  The USCG 
developed two systems, the Aviation Material Management System (AMMIS) and the 
Aviation Computerized Maintenance System (ACMS), as mission-critical, evolving 
systems (USCG Aircraft Repair and Supply Center, n.d.). The problem with having the 
two systems was the lack of integration, induced errors from inputting redundant data 
into two sources, and reduced efficiency at the user level (USCG, 2013).  The systems 
made more work for the logisticians and maintainers, creating the need for the USCG to 
seek an alternative system for collecting, processing, and integrating the data from the 
two sources into one database.  After conducting a business area analysis (BAA), the 
USCG selected the Aviation Logistics Management Information System (ALMIS) as a 
tracking system for equipment maintenance, cost, and scheduling. 
ALMIS consolidates the tracking and information data from AMMIS and ACMS, 
providing real-time savings through improved logistics management (OAO Corporation, 
1997, 1.2).  Operating in 26 air stations throughout the U.S., the USCG needed a 
collective database in order to properly manage, procure, and maintain more than 200 
aircraft across the nation (Deshpande, Iyer, & Cho, 2006).  Parts for the entire aviation 
fleet are supported through one central warehouse, managing in excess of 60,000 part 




microcosm of the aviation support structure for the U.S. Army; what the USCG does 
differently is in the implementation of a comprehensive tracking system aimed at saving 
money. 
A. AVIATION COMPUTERIZED MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
ALMIS was developed specifically to combine the products of two independent 
databases, ACMS and AMMIS.  As independent systems, each database provides 
different products to the user as well as the manager.  ACMS tracks all individual parts 
installed and maintenance flags, and it records the repairs via the serial numbers of all 
parts consumed (Deshpande et al., 2006).  Utilized by all USCG air stations, this database 
also provides maintenance planning and execution, and configuration management of all 
individual aircraft.  ACMS supports all day-to-day maintenance activities at the 26 
USCG air stations (Department of Transportation [DoT] & USCG, 2001).  ACMS’s 
purpose of tracking the “maintenance, repairs, calibration, and transportation times of 
avionics equipment and aircraft components” (OAO Corporation, 1997, 3.3) supports the 
user’s ability to query, through a user-friendly interface (UFI), the database in order to 
gain an operational manager’s status of components and configuration schedules (OAO 
Corporation, 1997, 3.3).  By utilizing the collection tools within the database, managers 
can access trend and statistical analyses, which in turn support the USCG’s reliability 
centered maintenance (RCM) program (OAO Corporation, 1997, 3.3). What this database 
could not provide the user are the financial aspects of the maintenance, logistics, and 
procurement elements. 
B. AVIATION MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM  
AMMIS is a stand-alone financial system operated at the USCG Aircraft Repair 
and Supply Center (ARSC).  This centralized location and system breaks down the 
monetary allotments by cost center, unit, fund code, and finally the dollar amount.  This 
data is then included in future USCG financial statements (Department of Homeland 
Security Office of Inspector General, 2009).  The detailed database: 
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…tracks every step of the process once the part comes off the aircraft.  It 
tracks demand requisitions (orders) placed to the warehouse, the shipment 
of good parts to the air stations and maintenance facility, the receipt of 
failed parts (carcasses), their shipment to vendors or in-house repair, and 
their induction back into the system. (Deshpande et al., 2006)  
Another by-product of AMMIS is its ability to provide total asset visibility 
(TAV), providing a visual of where all of the spare parts are located, either at the ARSC 
or the multiple air stations (DoT & USCG, 2001).  Besides fiscal and supply management 
oversight, AMMIS also provides a method of tracking “aircraft flight and operations 
tracking, pilot and aircrew training and qualification training, and flight pay reporting” 
(DoT & USCG, p. 22).  The AMMIS program is specifically designed to track 
calendar/scheduling-type movements and apply a cost figure to each entry.  The 
following is an itemized list of the many activities that AMMIS provides the user: 
• Flight Operations: 
• Operational Facility (OPFAC) Aircraft, including Receipt and 
Transfer Management, 
• OPFAC Personnel Management, 
• CG Aircraft Flight Record (4377) Data, and 
• Aircrew Training & Qualifications Management; 
• Fiscal Accounting: 
• Ledger Accounts Management, 
• Personnel Services Management, 
• Industrial Services Management, and 
• Data Tables Maintenance; 
• Supply: 
• Scheduled and Unscheduled Inventory, 
• Perform Inventory, 
• Inventory Management, and 
• Parts Shipment and Tracking, including 265 parts; and 
• Procurement: 
• Maintenance Requirement Package Management, 
• Government Furnished Property Accounting, 
• Purchase Request Administration, and 
• Purchase Obligation Management. (OAO Corporation, 1997, 3.3)  
Although AMMIS replaced obsolete software in late 1993, its own software 
needed refreshing and expandability after years of use (DoT & USCG, 2001).  ALMIS 
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was developed by the USCG to combine the ACMS and AMMIS databases.  The first 
iteration of ALMIS was delivered in 2000 with the purpose of being expandable as well 
as upgradeable (DoT & USCG, 2001). 
C. AVIATION LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS: 
BACKGROUND, OBJECTIVES, AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
In the late 1990s to 2000, the USCG employed OAO Corporation’s Information 
Technology Division—East to perform a BAA and other related services to analyze its 
two current information systems: the ACMS and AMMIS.  The BAA analyzed the need 
and applicability of ALMIS for the USCG’s Aeronautical Engineering Division (OAO 
Corporation, 1997, 1.2).  The USCG wanted a system that would not only be directed at 
saving money but would also combine the two current systems and be a user-friendly 
system supported and maintained by government and contractor personnel (OAO 
Corporation, 1997, 1.2).  Availability via the World Wide Web (WWW) and graphical 
user interface (GUI) technologies was another requirement for expandability and 
accessibility as dictated by the USCG (OAO Corporation, 1997, 1.2).     
The USCG further identified the five major business areas to be managed by a 
system such as ALMIS: aircraft maintenance (organizational and depot), flight 
operations, supply (organizational and depot), procurement management, and financial 
management.  The oversight, management, and visibility of these five areas would need 
to be accomplished by performing, at a minimum, the following functions: 
• Systems Analysis of Legacy Software Systems, 
• Analysis of Hardware and Telecommunications Systems, 
• BAA, 
• Business Process Modeling, 
• Logical and Physical Data Modeling, 
• Business Process Reengineering/Business Process Improvement 
(BPR/BPI), 
• Software Engineering, 
• System Design, and 
• Database Design. (OAO Corporation, 1997, 1.2)  
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With the decision to move forward with the ALMIS product, the BAA needed to 
identify hardware requirements, and operation support and training needs.  The hardware 
package operates on the same DEC 2100/Sable host computer at the ARSC Management 
Information Systems Division for both systems, ACMS and AMMIS.  USCG 
workstations provide access to users through the Coast Guard Data Network (CGDN).  
These hosts are interfaced via DEC 5000 office workstations that are connected to the 
development server and a separate DEC 3000 on the front end.  All maintenance and 
support is provided at the government and contractor personnel level (OAO Corporation, 
1997, 3.5.2.1).  Structured training programs have been instituted for users based on their 
level of access and functional need.  All database administrators receive more intensive 
training, to aid in the trouble-shooting and maintaining of the system, through a 
combination of classroom and on-the-job training (OAO Corporation, 1997, 3.7.5). 
The analysis conducted through outside agencies as well as having a defined need 
enabled the USCG to develop a user-friendly database aimed at saving money through 
data collection, management, and analysis.  The by-product of ALMIS provides the 
manager or requesting user with a compiled analysis of data in regard to cost, schedule, 
and performance.  Additional benefits are present through ALMIS’s upgradeability and 
flexibility.  Management of inventory, flight hours, flight pay, and mission logs create a 
historical document for the unit as well as for the USCG’s purview.   
D. ALMIS DESCRIPTION: OBJECTIVES, FLEXIBILITY, AND 
ASSUMPTIONS 
The objective of ALMIS is to be an integrated database able to support the 
following business practices: aircraft flight operations, aircraft maintenance and 
configuration, fiscal accounting, procurement management, aviation supply, and aviation 
headquarters (OAO Corporation, 1997, 5.1.2).  In addition, the USCG desired to access 
the data via Internet technology, the WWW, and a GUI.  Furthermore, the Executive 
Information System (EIS) would provide the user/manager with historical data enabling 
trend analysis (OAO Corporation, 1997, 5.2.1).   
 24 
The USCG required that the production of ALMIS include flexibility and 
expandability as a mainstay.  Designing the system in this fashion allows for updated and 
new hardware/software packages and a software development plan (SDP; OAO 
Corporation, 1997, 5.4.7.3).  By developing the SDP in accordance with Software 
Development and Documentation (MIL-STD-498; DoD, 1994), the USCG is able to 
deploy a flexible and expandable database system to all of its air stations (OAO 
Corporation, 1997, 5.4.7.3).  
As with any planning operation, a certain number of assumptions must be made in 
order to achieve a relative success for any objective.  The USCG identified the following 
assumptions when creating ALMIS.  The first assumption addressed the need for a 
contingency plan at the AR&SC as well as the USCG air stations in order to 
avoid/mitigate any major system degradation.  Second, by creating an integrated system 
(ALMIS), the USCG would decrease the burden, as well as clerical errors, on the user by 
eliminating the input of redundant information.  The third assumption was that all air 
stations would provide adequate training materials for all users and managers.  The last 
major assumption addressed the proper documentation to facilitate maintenance of 
ALMIS after installation (OAO Corporation, 1997, 5.1.4).  As the USCG identified 
objectives, flexibility, and assumptions, it was collectively more able to provide a 
narrower focus for the construction, development, and execution of the ALMIS program.  
These three areas of interest apply directly to the user interface and the USCG’s ability to 
implement and maintain this database for years to come.   
E. ALMIS: OPERATIONAL SCENARIOS AND IMPACTS 
ALMIS supports all facets of USCG aviation logistics and operations.  Managers 
can not only request ad hoc reports but also benefit from the multiple day-to-day 
operations performed by ALMIS.  Analysis provided by ALMIS functions includes air 
station performance assessment reports, aircraft availability, aircraft/personnel transfer 
and receipt, flight data documentation, flight itineraries, flight crew assignments, and 
mission results.  In addition, maintenance managers have the ability to request monthly  
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operating reports (MORPTs) and view cannibalization rates and man-hours per flight 
hour for all major aircraft systems.  Air stations utilize ALMIS to document the following 
daily tasks: 
• scheduled and unscheduled maintenance actions; 
• configuration management actions; 
• aircraft enrollment activities; 
• high-time component tracking; 
• tracking maintenance activities; 
• producing maintenance procedure cards; 
• reliability, maintainability, and availability management; 
• quality assurance management; 
• time compliance technical orders; 
• inventory management; 
• parts issue; 
• repairable parts management; 
• aviation inventory management; 
• stock-level adjustments; and 
• parts shipping management. (OAO Corporation, 1997, 6)  
Operationally, the use of ALMIS provides significant impacts to the 
organization’s ability to view, manage, assess, and modify maintenance programs.  
Ridding the unit of redundant and sometimes flawed inputs will increase work efficiency 
as well as provide managers with accurate and easily assessed data. According to OAO 
Corporation,  “Local and enterprise-wide trend analysis of inventory levels, unscheduled 
maintenance and funds expenditure will provide managers the ability to better predict 
aircraft availability, and ultimately, lead to greater levels of mission support” (OAO 
Corporation, 1997, 5.4.7.3).  This system allows the USCG the ability to accurately 
manage, schedule, and execute a maintenance plan that will better address the need for 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The Army is in a precarious position when it comes to validating the requirement 
for a FVL aircraft.  When considering the austere fiscal environment of the U.S. 
government, attaining approval and funding for a new acquisition category 1D (ACAT 
1D) program will require significant substantiation.  PEO Aviation is funding various 
research projects in hopes of supporting a FVL decision. Additionally, we acknowledge 
that numerous research approaches are available to help determine aircraft age.  Our 
approach aimed at defining the true cost behaviors of the current Apache and Blackhawk 
aircraft.  Our intent was to precisely identify the cost burden associated with individual 
aircraft, thus allowing the Army to see beyond its current process of simply funding 
aircraft sustainment on the aggregate.  In short, our research hypothesis was to determine 
if individual airframe cost over time can determine age.   
Based upon our research methodology, we believe that the Army currently lacks 
the ability to define with sufficient specificity the cost associated with any individual 
Apache or Blackhawk aircraft. Furthermore, the Army can identify individual aircraft 
cost behaviors, but doing so will more than likely require significant dedicated man 
power and time.  The Army will need to alter its current system of funding aircraft 
operations and sustainment on the aggregate or large unit level and shift its enterprise 
tracking system to have the ability to monitor individual aircraft.  Our conclusion is 
supported by aspects of the current Army maintenance system that include, but are not 
limited to, inconsistent data, a lack of detailed maintenance procedure information, and 
insufficient enterprise information tracking systems.  We highlight the aforementioned 
aspects in following paragraphs but define the situation in the following analogy. 
A. RESEARCH FINDINGS ANALOGY 
Assume that the current fleet of Blackhawk aircraft is instead a service fleet of 
trucks utilized by a large, intrastate shipping company.  The company’s fleet of 300-plus 
vehicles (i.e., Blackhawks) is over 30 years in age.  The company knows that the trucks 
break quite often and that repairs are sometimes expensive.  However, the company does 
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not track how often any of the individual vehicles break down or the repair cost 
associated with the failures—it just budget for annual maintenance estimates for the 
entire fleet.  Every year, it substantiates the next year’s budget by taking the previous 
year’s budget and adding a little more on top for inflation.  So, even though the trucks 
keep breaking, the company simply pays for the repair and looks ahead, regardless of 
how many times any individual truck has issues.   
All that the company cares about is keeping the fleet running in order to make 
deliveries and meet its corporate mission.  The company could not tell exactly what the 
historical maintenance cost of any specific truck that is in its fleet.  It never once thinks 
about whether keeping an old truck around is more expensive than buying a new one 
because it lacks the information tracking systems, and culture, to do so. Because the 
company cannot identify individual truck costs, it will never know if 10 percent of its 
fleet is absorbing 90 percent of the annual maintenance budget.  Based upon our research 
approach, what this fictitious truck company is doing, is exactly what Army Aviation is 
doing with the current fleet of Apache and Blackhawk aircraft. 
B. INCONSISTENT DATA 
PEO Aviation provided us with the records of 30 random Apaches and 30 random 
Blackhawks.  The only records available to us date back to when the respective aircraft 
were converted/upgraded from their original configuration to the current configuration 
(i.e., from when an Apache was upgraded from an “A” model to a “D” model).  This 
means that the Army did not retain any aircraft maintenance information prior to that 
upgrade, which could potentially mean that up to 15 years of aircraft maintenance data is 
unavailable.   
This is the first hindrance in determining the cost behavior of the aircraft because 
the documentation on the first half of an aircraft’s life no longer exists.  Furthermore, the 
only detailed maintenance information on file spans an average of five to seven years per 
airframe. We lacked detailed information from that point back to when the aircraft was 
upgraded.  The lack of historical maintenance data virtually eliminates the Army’s ability 
to define the precise cradle to present cost of any individual aircraft in the fleet.  Table 3 
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is an example of one aircraft’s data that was provided.  Notice how the data begins 
following the conversion in 2002. Table 4 shows detailed maintenance data for the same 












Table 4.   Unscheduled maintenance for Aircraft 105276 (from Apache, n.d.) 
08/08/2006 A 02 
ACFT RESTRICTED TO BE OPERATED I/A/W THE LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS PRESCRIBED BY THE ENCLOSED AWRS:2003D-A24 REV1 14 NOV 03 
(AMATS),2004D-A16 17 MAY 04 (ALQ-144C),2004D-A24 10 JUN 04 (COMBAT MANEUVERING FLIGHT),2004D-A39 REV1 15 DEC 05 (STROBES),2004D-A51 REV1 
04 AUG 05 (IZLID),2005D-A13 REV1 28 JUL 05 (MTF CALCULATOR),2005D-A26 29 JUL 05 (VMEPS),2005D-A39 19 SEPT 05 (CEP),2005D-A44 REV1 18 NOV 05 
(EDM),2006D-A19 17 APR 06 (MPSU) (DD9002) 
+ Yes 
08/08/2006 A 02 
AIRCRAFT RESTRICTED TO BE OPERATED I/A/W THE LIMITATIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ENCLOSED IN THE INTERIM STATEMENT OF AIRWORTHINESS 
QUALIFICATION, DATED 17 MAY 1999 INCLUDING REVISIONS # 1 THROUGH 13 (DD9002) 
+ Yes 
08/08/2006 A 00 PLTS LONG RVDT WIRE HARNESS NOT INSTALLED IN CLAMP TIED HARNESS WITH STRING TO BE CLAMPED AS SOON AS FWD FUEL CELL RMVD (DD9002) / Yes 
12/27/2005 A 02 ALQ-144 NOT INSTALLED ACFT REST FROM HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT (SL5082) + Yes 
03/17/2005 E 19A VCR WILL NOT RECORD SECURE COMMUNICATION DUE TO -9 LOT # CIU INSTALLED (MH9429) / Yes 
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As seen in the preceding figures, with this particular aircraft, there are three years 
of missing unscheduled maintenance data when compared to the beginning of the 
scheduled maintenance data.  Scheduled maintenance data starts in 2002 while 
unscheduled maintenance data starts in 2005—giving us a three-year gap in the data.  
This example is representative of the entire sample of 30 Apache logbooks we received.  
Some aircraft have larger gaps in data.  Overall, it is difficult to ascertain the overall cost 
of maintaining/operating an aircraft if the historical records no longer exist and/or are 
missing critical data.  For instance, our research team spent in excess of 40 man-hours 
attempting to determine the cost associated with just one aircraft when using the data 
provided. 
C. LACK OF DETAILED MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE DATA 
When conducting detailed analysis on the information that was provided, we 
quickly determined that there were many gaps and inconsistencies in the logbook entries.  
The largest issue was the lack of details on what corrective maintenance action the 
maintainer conducted to repair each fault.  The repair action is critical to determining the 
entire cost of a maintenance action.  Was the part replaced?  Did the repair inspection 
find no faults?  Such questions cannot be determined due to the lack of accurate historical 
data in the maintenance logs.   
Due to the lack of corrective action information, we were forced to assume that 
most actions required a complete part replacement.  Although we only looked, in detail, 
at Apache and Blackhawk data, we assume that this issue could be indicative of the entire 
Army Aviation fleet.  Table 5 is an example of how the lack of repair action information 
can mislead the cost associated with a maintenance action.   
Table 5.   Example entry for Aircraft 105276 (from Apache, n.d.) 
02/20/2007 A 05 
CRACK FOUND ON #3 MAIN ROTOR BLADE. CRACK LOCATED 2 
INCHES LEFT OF TIP CAP. 
X Yes 
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The entry identifies the crack in the main rotor blade, but the lack of repair action 
information could result in gross miscalculation of the repair cost.  For instance, was the 
blade completely replaced or was the unit’s internal shop assets able to repair the blade 
through other measures? This could be interpreted as a $300,000 replacement or a simple 
one-man-hour quick fix. 
D. INSUFFICIENT ENTERPRISE MAINTENANCE INFORMATION 
TRACKING SYSTEMS 
Army Aviation does an exceptional job at providing soldiers in the fight with 
fantastic maintenance tracking and documentation systems.  Tactical units can track daily 
maintenance actions in real time, which is a cornerstone to the success of Army Aviation 
in combat during the Global War on Terror.  Soldiers in the fight have mastered the 
ability to quickly detect faults and repair them.  Unfortunately, the information in the 
systems being used by soldiers (i.e., ULLS-A) is nebulas and subject to unit norms.  
Simply put, different units accomplish and enter maintenance activities differently, thus 
causing gross inconsistencies within the fleet.    
Soldiers are laser-focused on completing maintenance tasks and will do so much 
more quickly than estimated by man-hour allocation charts; yet, they will enter varying 
completion times for the same task.  Furthermore, corrective action information is not 
tied with actual parts usages and the cost associated thereof.  Inaccurate man-hour and 
parts allocation tracking is a catalyst for the lack of detailed, all-encompassing 
maintenance data needed to determine the cost behaviors of aircraft.  Our research 
required the utilization of numerous information systems to try and coagulate the total 
flight-hour cost associated with one aircraft.   
We did gain exposure to the USCG’s ALMIS system, which possesses much of 
the functionality required for a successful aviation enterprise tracking system.  The 
ALMIS system provides robust data but lacks an enterprise way of incorporating parts 
costs to specific aircraft.  Individual aircraft parts usage is tracked by a separate system 
but not integrated with the ALMIS system.  ALMIS is well suited as an enterprise 
tracking system that, we believe, is on the cusp of being able to identify exact aircraft 
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costing behaviors over time.  ALMIS’s tie-in with USCG automated maintenance 
systems makes it a very reliable resource to determine maintenance trends over time for 
specific aircraft. 
E. CLOSING 
We were unable to provide an answer to our research hypothesis, but we did 
objectively identify a key issue that will possibly hinder Army Aviation’s efforts to 
pursue a FVL program.  Our research identified the notion that the Army cannot 
determine the cost associated with any individual aircraft and whether that aircraft is 
costing more to maintain over time.  Because the current Army data cannot reveal that 
critical information, it is nearly impossible to determine the point in time when a new 
aircraft should be pursued.  With that said, our findings are relegated to the information 
provided by the Army’s leading source and subject-matter experts: PEO Aviation.  If 
detailed individual aircraft costing data becomes available, then this research should be 
updated in hopes of answering our original thesis.   
F. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on our conclusions, we recommend that the Army adopt an enterprise 
system that allows it to better track the costs of maintenance at the individual aircraft 
level.  The USCG has developed ALMIS, which the Army can use as a template, but 
there are certain capabilities that we think are key to being able to meet the objective laid 
out in this project.  The capabilities that we see as key to success, in addition to the ones 
already provided by existing software, are to easily trace faults to corrective actions, 
accurately track man-hours for corrective actions, and tie the supply system to particular 
aircraft to better track costs.   
One of the major challenges that we had during our research was being able to 
take a fault that was identified in the records we were provided and trace that fault to the 
corrective action that was completed to fix the fault.  As discussed previously, any 
number of different corrective actions can be taken to fix a cracked rotor blade write-up, 
to include no action at all.  With the current system and the data that we were able to 
retrieve, there was no way of correlating each individual fault with the maintenance 
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action used to correct that fault.  Without this information, there is no way of determining 
how much was spent to fix the faulty item(s).  This lack of information can amount to 
difference of tens of thousands of dollars in cost estimation differences for individual 
faults, and without this information, there is no way to determine how much we are 
spending on an aircraft. 
The next key capability is that the system needs to be able to accurately track the 
man-hours spent on corrective actions.  The problem with this information is that it is 
subjective and easily skewed by inaccurate entries because the maintainer will be 
required to enter the number of hours spent on each action.  The USCG system 
successfully uses this indicator in tracking the number of man-hours spent on aircraft 
maintenance and is able to show trends in man-hours over time with this data.   
The final—and, in our opinion, the most important—key to accurately tracking 
maintenance costs on individual aircraft is to be able to tie the supply system to the 
maintenance tracking system so that the Army can easily determine what parts were used 
in the repair of an aircraft.  Based on the data that we collected, the most important 
determinant in costs was the parts used for the maintenance actions.  We believe that an 
enterprise solution is necessary to successfully tie these two very different tracking 
systems together.  There are many other benefits to this type of system that should also be 
considered, but they are not as directly relevant to our MBA project. 
While we understand that there are high costs associated with such a vastly 
different system like the one we are recommending, we think that the benefits of such a 
system greatly outweigh those costs.  The Army is in a period of drawdown and will start 
having to fight for dollars again.  An enterprise system that helps show actual costs and 
trends of programs is one that helps the Army to support its request to purchase future 
combat systems.   
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